IN THE AFTERMATH OF AUTHORSHIP VIOLATIONS IN PHILOSOPHY: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS
In what scenarios do authors use pseudonyms?

- To discuss or promote one’s previously-published work
- To hide authorship in “hoax” articles
- To protect authors of unpopular or controversial opinions
- To hide one’s identity from a particular journal editor
Leila Tov-Ruach is an Israeli Psychiatrist, who writes and lectures on philosophical psychology.

Amélie Oksenberg Rorty is a professor of philosophy at Rutgers University.


14. I am grateful to Amélie Rorty for the hospitality that made the writing of this paper possible. She was kind enough to make available to me a number of the papers published in this volume: stimulated by them, and by her skeptical questions, I was able to work through some problems that arose from Stanley Cavell’s interpretation of *Othello*. Discussions with Marcia Aufhauser and Margaret Gilbert were helpful.
VERIDICAL HALLUCINATION AND PROSTHETIC VISION

David Lewis

I see. Before my eyes various things are present and various things are going on. The scene before my eyes causes a certain sort of visual experience in me, thanks to a casual process involving light, the retina, the optic nerve, and the brain. The visual experience so caused more or less matches the scene before my eyes. All this goes on in much the same way in my case as in the case of other people who see. And it goes on in much the same way that it would have if the scene before my eyes had been visibly different, though in that case the visual experience produced would have been different.

How much of all this is essential to seeing?

Princeton University

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DISCUSSION
CENSORED VISION

Bruce Le Catt

When we see in the normal way, the scene before the eyes causes matching visual experience. And it does so as part of an extensive pattern of counterfactual dependence: over a wide range of different alternative scenes and correspondingly different alternative experiences, other scenes would likewise have caused matching visual experience. The same is true if we see in certain abnormal ways, for instance by means of a prosthetic device. But abnormal cases are possible in which the scene before the eyes might cause matching visual experience by triggering some one-off or random causal mechanism, insensitive to the details of the scene, which just happens to produce the right experience. In such a case, matching depends on the scene

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David Lewis = Bruce Le Catt
good pattern of counterfactual dependence whereby visual experience depends on what goes on at the intermediate stage. Further, this two-fold pattern might link scenes indirectly with matching experience, over a suitably wide and varied range of scenes. Even more indirectly, there might be linkage via a threefold pattern of counterfactual dependence involving two intermediate stages; and so on. Then we have a suitable pattern of stepwise counterfactual dependence of visual experience on the scene before the eyes. It does not follow that we have a suitable pattern of counterfactual dependence simpliciter, because counterfactuals are not necessarily transitive. In fact my case of the censor is a case of excellent stepwise dependence and no dependence simpliciter at all. LeCatt suggests, and I agree, that it is the stepwise dependence that accounts for any inclinations we have to judge the case of the censor as a positive case of seeing. He further claims that this judgment is correct; but there I do not agree, and I insist that the essential feature of seeing is altogether missing.

But there are mixed cases: partial or conditional censorship, some dependence simpliciter but not much compared with normal cases. Then indeed the presence of stepwise dependence might make the difference between better cases and worse.
What is wrong with the occasional pseudonym?

- Lessens author accountability
- Hinders an accurate history of philosophy
- Produces an illusion of increased interest in a topic
- Creates a downstream literature problem
Pseudonyms in Philosophy

- In 2017, I sent authorship clarification requests to editors and publishers for 11 pseudonymously published articles in philosophy.

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6 of the 11 articles were corrected with published clarifications of authorship.
To avoid post-publication pseudonym surprises:

- Explicitly encourage institutional email addresses in manuscript submission portals
- Require identity confirmation for submissions from unaffiliated authors (e.g., link to web presence)
- Require authors to use ORCID identifiers in submission portal
- Issue corrections for past articles published under pseudonyms
Plagiarism

Why should editors, publishers, and researchers be concerned about plagiarism in published research articles?

Plagiarism creates inefficiencies across all levels of knowledge production.
Plagiarizing articles

- Deny genuine researchers credit for their work
- Falsify the history of discovery
- Create duplications in the research literature
- Take up valuable space in journals that should have gone to authentic articles
- Waste the time and resources of editors, peer reviewers, publishers, whistleblowers
- Confer an illusion of research productivity to plagiarists, and this façade can generate unwarranted promotions, grants, new offers of employment, book contracts
- Are Doppelgänger articles, taking citations away from their hidden sources, thereby disrupting impact factors, bibliometrics, and altmetrics (The Downstream Problem)
ADDITIONS TO THE PUBLISHED RESEARCH LITERATURE: THE NORMATIVE ROUTE
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Plagiarizing Articles Generate a Corruption of the Downstream Research Literature
The Whistleblower as Undeceived Reader
To whom can one blow the ethical whistle for suspected plagiarism?

Whistleblowers need guidance from journals and publishers.
Varieties of Plagiarism in Philosophy

- Straightforward Plagiarism
- Disguised Plagiarism
INTRODUCTION

The idea of duty, I wish to argue, is composed of a person’s performance that is valuable to others and the degree of responsibility he has over that performance. This is consistent with the classic constitutional framework of desert that most philosophers and political theorists (e.g., Aristotle, 1984) have adopted.

In Aristotle, however, duty is only part of a wider model of praise or blame bestowed on voluntary action. Moreover, Aristotle’s notion of desert is complicated because, as Frank has argued, the ability for desert “vary with the attributes of the particular goods being distributed.”

The idea of duty should be proportional to the person’s display of virtue or vices (e.g., merit). Goods should be distributed in proportion to the individual’s action by a person’s exceptional and unique contributions to society.

The natural model is susceptible to distortion by good or ill luck, however. Because what we should ask is that a person achieve what he actually manages to or display (at least to some extent) on good or ill luck. That is to say, a person’s desert is determined where-what actions of that person contribute to his being good or bad by the fact that he is the best possible person that he can be.

The relationship between desert and performance is therefore influenced by two general forms of chance. Firstly, the performance itself may be ideal by moral and social advantage, and subsequent success of good fortune. Secondly, that good fortune may come into what is called the natural world by the factor of luck. Hence, our concern may be that the quality of a person’s well-being is determined not only by the factor that is not under our own control but also by the factor that is under our own control.

For example, we judge a drunk driver who has a pedestrian to be guilty of manslaughter, yet because he was morally incapacitated, the intention of a man to injure has not achieved it. This shows that our rule of moral judgment is paradoxical in that the problem of control rules out judgments to which we hold fast.

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This article retracts the following:

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The following article from the Heythrop Journal, ‘Being Lucky and Being Deserving, and Distribution’ by published online on 07 June 2010 in Wiley Online Library (http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com), has been retracted by agreement between the Journal Editor in Chief, Dr Patrick Madigan, and John Wiley & Sons Ltd. The Retraction has been agreed due to the identification of large amount of plagiarised content present in the article from a thesis published by Professor Simon Wigley (http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/1504/).
Subjectivity from a Semiotic Point of View

1. Preliminary Remarks

I would like to say something here about the concept of subjectivity from a semiotic point of view. Of course it is not the first to deal with this problem. Though subjectivity has received little attention by semioticians in the past, this situation has changed dramatically in the last decade. It is now by no means unusual to find articles or entire monographs dealing with subjectivity, written in English, French or other European languages. An interest in subjectivity semiotics is no longer an eccentricity; one might even say that it has recently become fashionable. Semiotics involves the study of signification, but signification cannot be isolated from the human subject who produces and is defined by it. So if the topic needs no apology, some preliminary remarks on the sense of this ambiguous term might nevertheless be helpful.

Among linguists the notion of subjectivity concerns the expression of self and the representation of a speaker — or, more generally, a locutionary agent’s perspective or point of view in discourse (cf. Sidis & Wright 1995). Among other professional students of language, the word subject and its derivative subjectivity tend to evoke a grammatical association “subject” or domain from direct object, for example. In some contexts, subjectivity contrasts with objectivity in suggesting something “self”, unremittable, even suspicious. The notion of subjectivity plays various roles in European languages (Lyons 1982: 101). While the English “subjectivity” has recently acquired a somewhat pejorative connotation, by virtue of its opposition with a positivist interpretation of “objectivity”, the French “subjectivité” and the German "Ichfilter" are more neutral. The subjectivity of the text is an important aspect of its existential value. However, distinguishing between objective and subjective views is not always straightforward, as many factors can influence human perception and cognition. The relationship between reality and representation is complex, and the distinction between subjective and objective meanings is not always clear-cut.

The primordial uniqueness of the human being, and thus for the basic irreducibility of the human being to the natural world. This assumption forms the basis of understanding the human being as a person. Traditional Aristotelian anthropology was based on the definition **α ἄνθρωπος ζῷον νοητὸν (homo est animal rationale).** This definition fulfills Aristotle’s requirements for defining the species (human being) through its proximate genus (living being) and the feature that distinguishes the given species in that genus (endowed with reason). At the same time, however, the definition is constructed in such a way that it excludes—at least at first glance—the possibility of accentuating the irreducible in the human being. In this definition, the human being is mainly an object, one of the objects in the world to which the human being visibly and physically belongs. In this perspective, objectivity was connected with the general assumption of the reducibility of the human being. The term subjectivity, on the other hand, proclaims that the human being’s proper essence cannot be reduced and explained by the proximate genus and specific difference. In other words: Subjectivity is a synonym for the irreducible in the human being.
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in a misunderstanding of the reflexive pronoun. To ask what kind of substance my “self” is, is like asking what the characteristic of “ownness” is, an attribute which my own property has in addition to being mine. When, outside philosophical reflections I, talk about myself, I am simply talking about the human being, _I_., and my self is nothing other than myself. In some way it is a philosophical muddle to allow the space which differentiates “my self” from “myself” to generate the illusion of a mysterious metaphysical entity distinct from, but obscurely linked to, the human being who is talking to someone. The grammatical error which is the essence of the theory of the self may seem obvious when it is pointed out. But it is by no means easy to give an accurate account of the logic, or deep grammar, of the words “I” and “myself”. It will not do, for instance, to say simply that “I” is the word each of us uses to refer to himself, a pronoun which, when it occurs in sentences, is synonymous with the name of the utterer of the sentence. This is not difficult to show. Julius Caesar, in his _Commentaries_, regularly described his own actions in the third person, using the name “Caesar”
Statement of retraction

We have received a letter from personnel of the Ohio Dominican University, supported by Marquette University Press, concerning an essay appeared in a 2001 collection from Acta Semiotica Fennica (a book series launched by our Institute). In its key passage, the letter reads as follows:

"We have observed that a chapter appearing in a volume published by the International Semiotics Institute appears to fail short of adequate citation practice. It is Peter Schmitz’s “Subjectivity from a Semiotic Point of View.” In Nordic-Baltic Summer Institute for Semiotic and Structural Studies, Part IV: Economics; Studies in Environmental Semiosis, Semiotics of the Biosignetic Bodies, Human/Non Human, edited by Erno Tuominen, Richard Leatfield, Lotta Ruus, Marja Reus (International Semiotics Institute, 2001: 149-159.

The chapter appears to consist substantively of texts passed together from various authors without quotation marks, either with inadequate attribution or no attribution at all. The document accompanying this letter highlights select passages from the article that are taken verbatim or near verbatim from works by other authors. The claim was supported by ample evidence and was followed by a request for retraction from our part. To verify the claim, we have appointed a committee to read carefully through Prof. Schmitz’s text, and cross-check with the sources indicated by the colleagues at Ohio Dominican University. After the examination, we regret to say that the committee has fully confirmed the claim, and therefore has declared the essay in question plagiarized from various sources.

- To this effect, the present letter constitutes an official statement of retraction of that essay. This means, among other things, that:
  - We wish to dissociate ourselves from that essay, stating clearly that it does not represent us, or our publishing policy.
  - We hope that this statement will reach out to all those colleagues and readers who are in possession of that book, so that they can be aware of this situation.
  - Should this book be republished in any form, hard-copy or e-copy, we will make sure that the essay is not included anymore in the collection.
As International Semiotics Institute, we are fully committed to academic honesty, and we wish to apologize to the damaged parties for this
Disguised plagiarism

• Typically immune to standard text-matching software
• Often unrecognized even by those familiar with the original source text
• Highly invisible to unsuspecting readers
Varieties of Disguised Plagiarism include:

**Compression Plagiarism**
- The distillation of a lengthy scholarly text into a short one, followed by the publication of the short one under a new name with inadequate credit to the original author
- Example: a lengthy book might be compressed into an article and published under new authorship

**Translation Plagiarism**
- The work of one author is republished in a different language with authorship credit taken by someone else
- Example: an article in German is published in English under new authorship
A Case of Suspected Compression Plagiarism: N. 2006

COMMENT ON CONSTRAINED MANEUVERING 469

In order to clarify my point, I am going first to distinguish between two different concepts of reasoningableness: a strong and a weak one. Drawing upon this distinction, I shall further demonstrate in what sense Tindale refers to a weak concept, whereas the pragma-dialectic approach applies a strong concept of reasoningableness. This clarification should help us, finally, to understand to what extent rhetoric might be considered as reasonable on its own terms. If one departs from the colloquial use of the word “reasonable” or “rational”, one notices immediately that this term can encompass different things depending on the objective area to which it is applied: deliberation, opinions, or arguments may be candidates for reasoningableness within the cognitive area; actions within the behavioral area; and desires within the emotional area. When we call discourses, arguments, or thoughts reasonable, we are referring to them neither as to linguistic constructs nor as regards the respective content of their declarative statements (technically speaking, the proposition or the propositional subject matter). Such a content is either true or false, but not reasonable or unreasonableness. Rather, by using the expression “reasonableness” we are describing opinions in a much broader sense. In the following, “opinion” should be understood as a proposition held to be true. Holding a proposition to be true includes believing, expecting, supposing something, being convinced of something, considering its possibility, etc. So, holding an opinion is a relation between a subject (S) and a proposition (P), which can be formalized as “S is of the opinion that P”. To be exact, one has to add: S is of the opinion p at a certain point in time or during a certain period of time (t), i.e. “S is of the opinion p at time t”. A further insight into the meaning of the word “reasonable” can be gained by looking at its opposite. In contrast with simple descriptive words, the expression “unreasonable” possess a normative component in our cultural context. To say that someone is behaving unreasonably means not only to suggest that a certain statement or action of the subject has the named characteristic. It also usually includes a negative evaluation or criticism of such a statement or action, since standards of reasoning are not fulfilled. These standards may be rendered briefly by the keyword “well-founded”: opinions, actions, etc. are reasonable when they can be justified via reasons. Hence it is obvious that the meaning of “reasonable” is relative: opinions are defended relative to the argumentation standards possessed by the subject S in relation to the respective facts at the time t. And we could even add, following Tindale, that those standards of the subject are not isolated from a certain audience, but rather for the most part adapted from it. Whenever relative arguments are present, we can speak of “reasonableness” in a weak sense. In contrast, a “strong” concept of rationality requires that the criteria to which one refers in the process of the relative substantiation of opinions and actions can themselves be proved as reasonable. The strong concept of reasoningableness lays thus claim to universality: it implies that certain standards of substantiation can be justified independently of any audience. Regarding arguments, this would mean that there are norms, goals, or values which can be justified independently of a given specific audience which is being addressed. At this point it seems necessary to introduce another distinction not always sufficiently addressed in the discussion of the relative validity of reasoning. Whether or not it is reasonable to have opinion p depends on two conditions: on the one hand, on the relative cognitive condition; on the other hand, on the rules of rationality. By cognitive condition, I mean the whole set of accepted opinions, convictions, evidences, and goals possessed by a certain person at a certain period in time in front of a specific audience. This cognitive state must be distinguished from the rules of rationality. To be sure, both of them go hand in hand at every stage of reasoning. Even so, they can always be disentangled as its separate components. Reasonableness is relative, first of all, with regard to the respective cognitive initial state. Secondly, it is relative with regard to certain rules or standards of theoretical reasoning. Discussing the problem of reasoningableness and its relative line, then, one has to be aware of the kind of relativity being referred to. The relativity regarding the respective cognitive initial state seems not only unproblematic, but it is even inevitable. The second type of relativity is different, though, in that it regards the rules of reasoningableness. In so doing, it raises the question whether or not one can find such rules applicable to all audiences and, if so, which ones. A major problem of the relativistic view of reasoningableness is that the expressions “reasonable” and “substantiated” lose their normal meaning. According to this view, “reasonable” is nothing more than “substantiated” for a certain person or a group of persons; in other words, for a specific audience. For the so-called “relativists”, the rules of reasoningableness are exclusively dependent on the particular audience or context; they allow no context-independent judgment. As a result, any claim to universality is denied. Therefore, a relativist will maintain that standards of reasoning are completely arbitrary and cannot be justified by reasons which go beyond the specific audience. Where does the distinction between cognitive claims and rules of reasoning and the related distinction between weak and strong sense of reasoningableness lead us regarding Christopher Tindale’s claim that rhetoric is reasonable on its own terms? From what has been said so far it follows that we might indeed admit reasoningableness of rhetoric
COMMENT ON CONSTRAINED MANEUVERING

A Case of Suspected Compression Plagiarism: N. 2006

In order to clarify my point, I am going first to distinguish between two different concepts of reasonableness: a strong and a weak one. Drawing upon this distinction, I shall further demonstrate in what sense Tindale refers to a weak concept, whereas the pragma-dialectic approach applies a strong concept of reasonableness. This clarification should help us, finally, to understand to what extent rhetoric might be considered as reasonable on its own terms.

If one departs from the colloquial use of the word “reasonable” or “rational,” one notices immediately that this term can encompass several different things depending on the objective area to which it is applied: deliberation, opinions, or arguments may be candidates for reasonableness within the cognitive area, actions within the behavioral area, and desires within the emotional area. Arguments, opinions, or thoughts reasonable, we are referring to them neither to linguistic constructs nor as regards the respective content of their declarative sentences (technically speaking, the proposition or the propositional subject matter). Such a content is either true or false, but not reasonable or unreasonable. Rather, by using the expression “reasonable” we are describing opinions in a much broader sense. In the following, “opinion” should be understood as a proposition held to be true. Holding a proposition to be true includes believing, expecting, supposing something, being convinced of something, considering its possibility, etc. So, holding an opinion is a relation between a subject (S) and a proposition (P), which can be formalized as “S is of the opinion that p...” To be exact, one has to add: S is of the opinion that p at a certain point in time or during a certain period of time (t), i.e.: “S is of the opinion p at time t.”

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Where does the distinction between cognitive claims and rules of rationality and the related distinction between weak and strong sense of reasonableness lead us regarding Christober. Tindale’s claim that rhetoric is reasonable on its own terms? From what has been said so far it follows that we might indeed admit reasonableness of rhetoric in
RATIONALITY AS A CONDITION FOR INTERCULTURAL UNDERSTANDING

The discussion of intercultural communication is confronted by quite serious challenges — at times even questions about whether and under what conditions communication with the foreigner is possible at all. In this paper, first, I discuss how a semiotic perspective, that of the Turin-Moscow School of Semiotics, the discovery of new relations always demands the introduction of a code by which the newly discovered reality is identified and seen in relation to segments of reality already known. Regarding this "essential perspective," I discuss the alleged singularity of reason and argue that the "essential perspective" provides a complementary description from the external perspectives of the actors. In the second part of the paper a semantic analysis of concepts is undertaken: it gives some indication of the sense in which the alleged singularity of reason can be accurately discussed and assessed. In conclusion, the rationality of intercultural communication is considered in light of this sharpened perspective.

Keywords: Intercultural communication, rationality, relativity of reason, semiotics

0. Introduction

The topic of intercultural communication is currently experiencing nothing short of a boom. This also applies to a number of other social-scientific disciplines, such as linguistics and semiotics, philosophy, sociology and political science, social psychology and education or even international trade. Since the 19th century, various research traditions, especially

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time when the dissolving of the traditional ethical order, began in the 6th century B.C., was concluded: the traditional form of private and public life lost both its matter-of-factness as well as its unquestionable binding force. Besides the Persian wars, other possible reasons for this were the rise of international trade as well as travels for the purpose of education and research, travels which gave the Greeks an instant acquaintance with other ways and ways of life. Expecting that a behavior which was despised at home was accepted and even commended in another place also caused a deep insecurity. Such insecurity resounds clearly in Herodotus's description of the funeral customs of the Greek and Indian conquerors. "When Darius was king, he once summoned all the Greeks in the vicinity to come to him, asking them to name the price for which they would be willing to consume the corpses of their fathers. They answered that no amount of money would be able to persuade them to do so. Whereupon Darius summoned the Indian conquerors, who ate the corpses of their parents, and, in the presence of the Greeks [...], asked them to name the price for which they would cremate their dead fathers. They shrieked and implored him earnestly to desist from such godless utterances."

The consequences which could be drawn from such insights as to the limited validity of allegedly generally valid values were of a different nature still. One could deduce from this that one's own tradition represents only one of many possible conventions, which would mean it could be ascribed only a conditional value. Other Greeks tried to measure the different cultural traditions against one common criterion: for example, one such criterion taken into consideration above all was reasonableness. By means of reason — understood as the source of knowledge of cosmic, divine things — the suitability of one's own tradition could be tested; in part also its superiority over other life forms could be proved. However, from the beginning, the attempt to cope theoretically with this crisis by a return to the claim of the universality of reason was countered by the demands of those who accepted the differences in customs as decisive evidence for a legitimate ethical relativism and scepticism practiced in daily life.

Here is not the place to detail the changing definition of reason in the course of Western thinking, which one could characterize — roughly speaking — as a process of progressive dilution (cf. Baumgartner 1980). Thus, at the beginning of modern times, the problematic of the ancient idea of reason being aligned with cosmic truth resulted in different estimates of reason's efficacy. Hume's and Kant's criticism of the speculative nature of reason marked the beginning of the restriction of reason, thought to be too overrated in its possibilities of self-reflection and self-regulation, and the excessive demands made of it. As an outgrowth of the course of this development, the increasing occupation with reason as an object of empirical research must certainly be included. Characteristic of this transition in the preoccupation with reason is surely the fact that since Max Weber at the latest, the expression "rationality" has been displaced by the new term "rationality," a term being no less negatively charged. The change in the terminology is due to the fact that "rationality" describes the empirically ascertainable human capability of thinking and acting reasonably, which itself is accessible to scientific investigation. The metaphysical mingling attached to the term reason due to its linguistic history is bypassed through this terminological change. Still, the question remains: what is it that characterizes and constitutes rational communication with other cultures?

In our century — and so we come to the second example — the controversy surrounding the relativity of rationality has again become virulent; this time it was caused, among other things, by the rise of cultural anthropology and ethnology with their investigation of myths, rites and magic in archaic societies. The Occidental world-view's encounter with and discussion of mythic thinking led to the question of whether the standards of rationality in modern societies are, in fact, able to lay claim to universal validity or whether, instead, the term rational should be applied only to what is understood within the context of a particular way of life. This would mean that in modern societies a "higher" rationality of the sciences would be a chimera. The most prominent proponent of such a culturally relativistic view is philosopher Peter Winch, whose position is very near that of Ludwig Wittgenstein, the initiator of this continuing
time when the dissolving of the traditional ethical order, began in the 6th century B.C., was concluded: the traditional form of private and public life lost both its matter-of-facts as well as its unquestionably binding force. Besides the Persian wars, other possible reasons for this were the rise of international trade as well as travel for the purpose of education and research, travel which gave the Greeks an instant acquaintance with other cultures and ways of life. Experiencing that a behavior which was accepted elsewhere was not accepted in another place led to a deep insecurity. Such insecurity resounds clearly in Herodotus's description of the funeral customs of the Greek and Indian calicists. When Dareios was king, he once summoned all the Greeks in the vicinity to come to him, asking them to name the price for which they would be willing to consume the corpses of their fathers. They answered, no amount of money would be able to persuade them to do so. Whereupon Dareios summoned the Indian calicists, who ate the corpses of their parents, and, in the presence of the Greeks [...], asked them to name the price for which they would cremate their dead fathers. They shrieked and implored him earnestly to desist from such godless utterances.

The consequences which could be drawn from such insights as the limited validity of allegedly generally valid values were of a different nature still. One could deduce from this that one's own tradition represents only one of many possible conventions, which would mean it could be described only as a conditional value. Other Greeks tried to measure the different cultural traditions against one common criterion. For example, one such criterion taken into consideration was the religious significance. By means of reason — understood as the source of knowledge of cosmic, divine things — the superiority over other life forms could be proved. However, from the beginning, the attempts to cope theoretically with this crisis by a return to the claim of the universality of reason was countered by the demands of those who accepted the differences in customs as decisive evidence for a legitimate ethical relation and respect practiced in daily life.

Here is not the place to detail the changing definition of reason in the course of Western thinking, which one could characterize — roughly speaking — as a process of progressive relativization (cf. Karmann 1990). Thus, at the beginning of modern times, the problematic of the ancient idea of reason being aligned with cosmic truth resulted in different estimates of reason's efficacy. Hume's and Kant's criticism of the speculative nature of reason marked the beginning of the restriction of reason, thought to be inexcusable in its possibilities of self-reflection and unable to meet the excessive demands made of it. As an outgrowth of this, the increasing occupation with reason as an object of empirical research has certainly been included. Characteristic of this transition in the preoccupation with reason is surely the fact that since Max Weber, at the latest, the expression 'reason' has been displaced by the new term 'rationality', a term being not so negatively charged. The change in the terminology is due to the fact that 'rationality' describes the empirically ascertainable human capability of thinking and acting reasonably, which itself is accessible to scientific investigation. The metaphysical perspective attached to the term reason due to its linguistic history is bypassed through this terminological change. Still, the question remains: What is it that characterizes and constitutes rational communication with other cultures?

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The example shows that one is able to speak of any possible injury to the originality or individuality. It is a fact that in all cases the expression of originality and independence cannot be associated with the results of research, but in certain cases the originality of the research can be recognized as genuine. The main problem is that the originality of the research cannot be recognized as genuine if the research is not original. The fact is that the research is not original. The example shows that one is able to speak of any possible injury to the originality or individuality. It is a fact that in all cases the expression of originality and independence cannot be associated with the results of research, but in certain cases the originality of the research can be recognized as genuine. The main problem is that the originality of the research cannot be recognized as genuine if the research is not original.
Solutions: What can Editors and Publishers do to Dis-incentivize Academic Plagiarism?

- Avoid imposing statutes of limitations for plagiarism
- Assign DOIs to all older articles
- Communicate corrections to database/indexing services
- Correct secondary venues in which articles appear
Conscience in Renaissance moral thought: a concept in transition?

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A Note from the Editorial Board

On November 12, 2009, the Editorial Board was notified by Dr. J. Keus,, the French Lutheran-Augsburg Society and Prof. M.S. Dillinger (Ohio Dominican University) that Dr. Karamus plagiarized, Probability and Moral Evaluations in Late Medieval and Early Modern Times (Halle, Luther-Augsburg Society, 1999) was plagiarized by Dr. K.A.P. Swen in his article "The Origins of Probabilism in Late Scholastic Moral Thought: A Prolegomenon to Further Study," published in our journal some nine years ago.

The evidence of plagiarism provided to the Editorial Board is overwhelming and irrefutable. Swen not only adapted the general structure of Karamus' essay and favored the very same authors, but also copied numerous and extensive passages from Karamus' book (mainly without acknowledging it). Without any further documentation, Swen was neither able to present specific passages not taken from Karamus' book.

Moreover, it transpires that in the same manuscript Swen made an unacknowledged use of at least one other essay. On p. 117, Swen's argument in the meaning of the technical term probability is clearly indebted to the analysis given by J. Makowski in his study "The Making of Moral Theology," in which Swen cites only at p. 153.

The Editorial Board has unanimously decided that M.C.W. Swen's article must be retracted. This paper will no longer be made available electronically by the Publisher, and alerts indicating the plagiarism will be sent to the Publisher to all subscribers to the journal. We would like to thank our referees who identified these issues in their latest review of the manuscript.

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The Origins of Probabilism in Late Scholastic Moral Thought: A Prolegomenon to Further Study

The diversity in human character and mood is beyond belief; diversity not only among the mass of men, but in the same man; and in that man not only in different years or months, but also from day to day, hour to hour and even moment to moment. Jean Gerson, De perfectione cordis1.

Even now, at the close of the twentieth century, the study of late scholastic moral thought has still to come of age. While scholars have expended much effort in recent years on the study of the logic, metaphysics, natural philosophy and theology of the later middle ages2, the problems and issues of the moral thought of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries are the unfailing subject of medieval

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- Indicate clearly to readers how suspected authorship misconduct should be reported
IN THE AFTERMATH OF AUTHORSHIP VIOLATIONS IN PHILOSOPHY: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS